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Our fundamental assumption is that there
is no longer a rational basis for war or vio-
lent struggle between groups or nations
because of conflicts of interest or of ideol-
ogy. Violent solutions of such conflicts in
the past are debatable as long-run solutions
of competing interests, but, with the devel-
opment of atomic and nuclear weapons, the
common interest in survival has given reali-
ty to the pacifist’s old contention about the
ultimate absurdity of force as the solution
of human problems. &dquo;The brotherhood of
man,&dquo; writes C. Wright Mills, &dquo;is now less
a goal than an obvious condition of biolog-
ical survival. Before the world is made safe
again for American capitalism or Soviet
communism or anything else, it had better
be made safe for human life&dquo; (12).
Even before the development of modern
weapons of total annihilation, conflicting
groups have had much in common. In many
wars soldiers had to be strictly enjoined
from fraternizing with the nationals of the
enemy state. Moreover, the conquering
group did not always conquer permanently
by force of arms if its cause was flagrantly
unjust. Ideas of justice, of humanity, and
of democracy have been strangely resistant
to defeat on the field of battle. Common
ideals are more often shared by the majority
of warring groups than is generally realized.
The fact that the leaders on both sides use
much the same ideology to rationalize the
role of their side in the conflict suggests
that many of their followers need this re-
assurance about their own objectives. Thus
we assume that, in spite of differences be-
tween groups in values and goals, there is
sufficient community of interest to make
resort to aggressive behavior an irrational
means of conflict resolution.
I. Causes of War: Background
Factors
Our analysis of the causes of war and
group conflict will accordingly give greater
emphasis to irrational forces as far as the
great majority of people are concerned.
Specific leaders and specific minority fac-
tions may on occasion be operating more
on the model of Jeremy Bentham’s utili-
tarian man, but, by and large, such a model
is inadequate for an understanding of large-
scale conflict. An analysis of background
factors basic to group conflict must recog-
nize the differential motivational and cogni-
tive processes of three groups: ( 1 ) the
leaders, (2) the factions, and (3) the
masses, as well as the interaction between
these groups.
Six sources of irrationality can be recog-
nized as common in many people: (1) la-
tent hostility-the repression-projection syn-
drome ; (2) situational frustration and dis-
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placed aggression; (3) defensive group
identification; (4) institutional conformity
(which need not necessarily be based upon
defense mechanisms); (5) apathy or with-
drawal, and (6) cognitive nearsightedness
or shortsighted self-interest. These six fac-
tors vary in the degree of their direct re-
lation to group conflict as will presently
appear.
I. LATENT HOSTILITY
The older instinctual doctrine had a
ready answer for the satisfactions which
people seem to find in expressing their
hostility-namely, an innate need for ag-
gression. A more complex explanation comes
from the neo-Freudians, who describe a
repression-projection syndrome (1). This
syndrome develops from the frustrations
which occur in the socialization process and
the nature of the parent-child relationship.
Children repress actions which are regarded
as wicked, including acts of hostility toward
parents-especially when the immediate per-
sonal environment of the child emphasizes
the evil character of an act. But the wicked
desires remain and are attributed to others,
where they can be attacked and punished.
Thus the extro-punitive person derives sat-
isfactions of many sorts from conflict with
members of an out-group. He is indulging
his repressed interest in evil matters; he is
salving his conscience by projecting his
evil desires onto others and punishing the
other person who is the true evildoer; and
his repressed aggression finds release in
meting out such punishment. Moreover,
this way of releasing hostility may have
sufficient libidinal investment as to produce
sadistic tendencies. Reservoirs of repressed
hostility of this sort have been one reason
for mass attendance at public executions
and contribute heavily to one type of crowd
behavior. Any group-approved form of vio-
lence draws support from this source. It
must be admitted, however, that modem
institutionalized war may give less chance
for the expression of these tendencies than
the more personalized wars of an earlier
period, where personal combat, looting, and
rape were perhaps more common. But, even
if war itself does not give much satisfaction
to this motivation, it holds out exciting pros-
pects in the preliminary period leading up
to the outbreak of hostilities.
2. SITUATION FRUSTRATION AND
DISPLACED AGGRESSION
The displacement of hostility on out-
groups may often have its basis in genetical-
ly induced conflicts, as analytic theory sug-
gests. But displaced aggression may also
derive from the current deprivations and
frustrations of adult life (4). The discon-
tent in economic crises may lead to riots
against minority groups. The scapegoating
which occurs in this case is due to the fail-
ure to recognize the real cause of the dep-
rivation in the social world. The situation
may be too complex and the experience of
people too slight to identify the frustrating
agent. The difference between this situa-
tion-frustration and resulting displaced ag-
gression and the personality-based conflict
is that the first can be remedied by knowl-
edge about the nature of the external world,
whereas the second can be alleviated only
by gaining an understanding of one’s self
or some self-insight into one’s own conflicts
(8). Though these two types are logically
separable, they can be found together in
the real world and can afford mutual rein-
forcement. Thus the person characterized
by deep-lying hostility and extro-punitive-
ness, when further thwarted by his social
world, can seek relief in aggression against
some available out-group.
3. DEFENSIVE GROUP IDENTIFICATION
Both the mechanisms described above
have a natural outlet in aggression against
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other human beings. In addition, however,
there is a defensiveness which is less direct-
ly related to overt group hostility. Because
of insecurity in childhood, a deep inferiority
conflict is created, and one mechanism for
handling this conflict is to identify with
numbers and with power. The group sym-
bolizes both power and numbers, and, by
regarding it as an extension of the self, the
individual comes to share in its accomplish-
ments. A victorious football team is a great
asset to the egos of the members of the in-
stitution it represents. This emotional iden-
tification with the group sanctifies its ac-
tions and also demands competitive supe-
riority of the group’s actions. Moreover, the
group symbols become so real to its people
that action against a group symbol or a
threat to a group symbol becomes a threat
to the individual’s own ego. In other words,
defensive identification with the group has
the function of giving the individual ego
satisfactions that he cannot attain himself.
When, however, the group itself suffers de-
feat, his situation becomes desperate. The
Nazis came to power in Germany in good
part by exploiting the national inferiority
feelings of the German people. And the
French continued their Algerian war in part
because they could not accept the thought
of sinking into the status of a third-rate
power. Defensive group identification does
not necessarily demand violent group strug-
gle, since it can be satisfied in other ways,
such as the conquest of outer space, com-
petition to send up more, better, and bigger
satellites. But it can contribute mightily to
a war psychology under many circumstances.
4. INSTITUTIONAL CONFORMITY
It must also be recognized that there is
a generalized conformity to institutional
symbols representing legitimate authority
which is not necessarily a matter of de-
fense mechanisms. We all grow up in a
world in which adaptive and instrumental
learning will produce knowledge of the
legitimate rules of the game. One type of
role expectation has to do with the fact that
there are duly constituted sources of au-
thority which are to be obeyed in specific
situations. We do not create our own world
but adjust to the social realities already
created.
And the social reality in which we find
ourselves has us organized into role systems
in which we obey group decisions and lead-
ership decisions within certain limits. More-
over, this system of role relationships or in-
stitutions has a prearranged hierarchical set
of conformities. At the apex is loyalty to
the political state and obedience to its sym-
bols. The political state alone of all institu-
tions can inforce sanctions of physical co-
ercion. The nation is so structured that the
state has a monopoly of physical power,
and the expectations are that the leaders
will maintain and use this power. The citi-
zens of the modern nation are involved in
many groups, but their most potent involve-
ment is in the political state, in that all
other group allegiances must give way if in
conflict with national allegiance. Treason
in modem society is the greatest social
crime, just as heresy was in an older period
when the church was the dominant institu-
tion of the day. The machinery and sym-
bols of the political state were created his-
torically in war, conquest, confiscation, and
exploitation. The police character of the
state has been modified with the growth of
democracy to include many social service
functions, but its character as the most in-
clusive organization in society with a mo-
nopoly of physical force and its demands
for first allegiance still remain.
The development of the state has been
accompanied by an intensification of a fun-
damental perception of man about his so-
cial world. Men tend to see themselves and
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their kind as the figure against the back-
ground of outsiders (10). This in-group-
out-group dichotomy is exploited and in-
tensified by the state, which provides all
the ready-made aids for such dichotomous
thinking. The very structure of the state
assumes external enemies, and to be a citi-
zen member of a state carries the expecta-
tion of bearing arms against enemies. It is
true that part of the state apparatus has to
do with the peaceful mediation of the com-
peting claims of subgroups within it, but
an essential part of the state consists of the
means for the mobilization of all its re-
sources of economic and physical coercion
against out-groups.
One source of war, therefore, lies in the
habitual obedience of people to the symbols
of political authority and in the acceptance
of the superorganic character of national
concepts and symbols (2). This habitual
obedience often comes to be a blind obedi-
ence, not because people are showing iden-
tification with the aggressor, but because
this is the common learned response to the
situation. We are dealing, then, not with
the irrationality of the defense mechanism
but with a lack of discrimination in habitual
responding to highly critical situations.
With defense mechanisms, people give up
some larger goal for immediate satisfactions.
They escape the tension of the moment
through involving themselves more deeply
in other difficulties. With a blind habitual
response, the effects may be the same, in
that people do not assess the consequences
of their behavior for anything but the mo-
mentary situation. But there are differences
because there is an internal compulsion
about defensive behavior which is lacking
in the type of unquestioning obedience that
we have been discussing. This latter type
smooths the pathway for war because it
helps to assure the acquiescence of masses
of people for whom war itself is an evil.
The defensive mechanisms described above
create more of a push in the direction of
overt group conflict.
5. APATHY AND WITHDRAWAL
The complex nature of modem society
and the complexity of its problems, the
many and conflicting group demands upon
the individual, the remoteness of the data
he needs for meaningful decision-making
and group participation from his everyday
life, and the remoteness of his actions from
the final group outcome all lead in one di-
rection. This direction is withdrawing from
the psychological field, or, as Robert Frost
puts it, &dquo;Me for the hills where I don’t have
to choose.&dquo; Apathy toward public affairs is
characteristic of people in the large demo-
cratic states. In the Western democracies,
only a small fraction of the people belong
to political parties in the sense of participa-
tion in their activities. And the same lack
of involvement of the many is found in
almost all voluntary organizations and
groups. This clears the way, then, for the
motivated few to exercise a heavy influence
upon the trend of affairs. The motivated
few include both individual leaders of all
groups and the heavily involved interest or
ideological factions. These factions, more-
over, are more frequently pushing some
special interest of their own or some ideo-
logical position not necessarily in the public
interest. There are groups from time to
time which are motivated for a cause much
broader than the segment of society they
represent. But too often democratic func-
tioning means that many special interests
push their own causes, and the resulting
compromises are deemed in the public in-
terest. This outcome may be a far different
public interest, however, than if the ma-
jority of the citizens had been motivated
to pursue their common interest.
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6. COGNITIVE NEARSIGHTEDNESS
In dealing with defense mechanisms we
are dealing with emotional compulsions
which drive people from a consideration of
social realities; in dealing with apathy we
are confronted with a lack of motivation
to examine the facts. There is another fac-
tor, however, which is more cognitive than
motivational which comes between people
and a realistic appraisal of their problems.
It has to do with the law of least effort as
it applies to cognitive processes. Human
beings tend not to see beyond their noses.
The immediate situation which confronts
them is more important than related situa-
tions which they may experience tomorrow
or the next day. A case study means more
than rows of statistics. A concrete demon-
stration means more than the presentation
of the scientific principles upon which the
demonstration is based. The meaning of
things is not examined very carefully with
respect to their future or their past. This
immediacy in living has many advantages,
but it also may militate against a long-run
intelligent course of conduct. Much of group
and social policy has to have a larger frame
of reference, both spatially and temporally.
People will approve specific actions on a
day-to-day basis and then be surprised at
where the cumulation of these actions has
taken them. If aggressive conflict and war
are to be avoided, people need to consider
the contribution which their daily actions
make to this end result.
The apparent irrationality of human be-
havior may thus often result from a limited
cognitive perspective rather than from a
lack of logic. The standards people use in
arriving at judgments are much more com-
plete and differentiated in relation to de-
cisions about their own personal affairs than
they are about political and international
issues. Hence their judgments in the former
instance seem more sensible and more ra-
tional to the observer. Many people who
react in terms of blanket discrimination to
the symbols which represent other ethnic
groups will behave fairly and considerately
in interpersonal relations with members of
these groups (9). The expression &dquo;some of
my best friends are ...&dquo; shows rationaliza-
tion at its worst, but it also shows the double
standard that people employ in personal,
as against impersonal, relations.
The reason for the more adequate stand-
ards for judgments in the everyday affairs
of the person is the continuing and detailed
feedback from his reactions to this re-
stricted environment. His perception and
treatment of the men in his own work
group immediately produce additional in-
formation, which becomes part of his cogni-
tive structure. This flow of sensory feedback
is not available to the individual with re-
spect to the larger issues involving his na-
tion. Hence his standards for making judg-
ments about international matters or even
national issues may be too vague and too
fragmentary for decisions of discrimination
and wisdom. Those who would remedy the
matter by educational and informational ef-
forts are on sound ground. The great weak-
ness in this approach through information,
however, is the failure to make such infor-
mation functional to the average man in his
daily mode of operating. Somehow the in-
formation must be a feedback in response
to his own behavior rather than an educa-
tional program as such. Otherwise there is
no correlation between the flow of informa-
tion and the cognitive structures created in
the minds of men (7).
II. The Role of Leaders
and Factions
These factors, then, account for the in-
volvement of people in group struggle when
it is not to their rational interest to be so
involved. They find themselves in war either
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because their emotions got in the way of
intelligent behavior or because they with-
drew from the field or because they took
actions without considering the conse-
quences. But most of these factors, while
they describe the general conditions which
make war possible, do not account for the
dynamics of any specific conflict. Two other
elements must be considered in the process:
the role of leaders and the role of factions
or leadership groups. Leaders may have the
same defensive motivations as followers and,
because of their leadership position, may
move their countries to war or to the brink
of war. Some of the Nazi leaders could be
so characterized. But though in certain pe-
riods of history fanatical leaders of social
movements may have deep needs for ag-
gression, leaders in general show a more
realistic motivation, a more rational and in-
telligent basis for their actions. They are
motivated to stay in power and to maintain
all the perquisites of their office; they may
aspire to even higher positions in the leader-
ship structure; and they may enjoy the
challenge of their position. In general, then,
they are not likely to indulge impulses which
could make for self-destruction. They tend
to weigh their decisions with respect to con-
sequences. Nevertheless, such realistic ap-
praisal is no guaranty of the peaceful out-
come of the actions of leaders.
The problems of conflicting groups in his
own country may be beyond the powers of
resolution of the leader. He has no prospect
of rising in the power structure or of hold-
ing his position in it by a genuine solution
of such conflicts. Hence his own selfish in-
terest may dictate a course which rallies
the nation by capitalizing upon any con-
ceivable threat to the nation from without.
Orwell describes the technique of localized
conflicts which keep totalitarian govern-
ments in power (13).
Moreover, leaders may appeal to the de-
fensive behavior of potential followers in
any situation where there is complexity, un-
certainty, and confusion. The opposition
party is the party of treason. It is a tech-
nique which will lose no votes and may gain
some. In addition, leaders must show their
basic membership character as representa-
tive of the nation, not only to appeal to
more people but because, as leaders of the
political state, people feel it is appropriate
for their leaders to be patriots first and
mediators of democratic competition be-
tween subgroups second. The common bond
between all people in the national state is
their identification with national symbols,
with national interest, with national history.
The leader of a nation can work for the
specific realities behind these global emo-
tional symbols, but in times of crisis it is
easy to fall back upon the symbols them-
selves in their capacity to arouse defensive
needs.
By &dquo;faction&dquo; or &dquo;leadership group&dquo; is
meant the heavily involved minority, well
organized to represent some interest or some
ideological position. Such a faction is a
leadership group in the sense that it exerts
or may exert a great deal of influence upon
national policy. Again its members may be
motivated by defense mechanisms, but they
can also be working rationally for their own
narrow self-interest. The imperialistic ambi-
tions of the oil interests are a case in point.
Though we admit that conflicts between
nations may arise out of such economic
strivings, we deny that this type of rational
self-interest is common enough to all mem-
bers of one nation in competition with an-
other to explain wars adequately on the basis
of a rational model.
Another type of factional interest is com-
monly noted in groups which do not press
for war but seek to expand their own roles.
The branches of the military service push
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for the expansion of their own services and
together press for the expansion of the mil-
itary as against the civilian budget. And
armament firms may have similar motivation
to increase expenditures for their products.
The military, however, is often interested
more in the maintenance and growth of its
own plant than in risking it in war. The
German generals were enthusiastic about
the support of the Hitler regime in devel-
oping the military might of Germany but
were reluctant to take unnecessary chances
with it. Thus, while some factional interests
do not want violent struggle, they develop
the machinery for making its occurrence
highly probable.
Factions are of importance in national
decisions not so much because they write
their own ticket with respect to pushing
their own narrow group interest as because
the influence they exert may be dispropor-
tionate to their numbers. Any organized
minority pressing for limited but clear ob-
jectives is a factor to be reckoned with in
practical politics at almost all stages of the
political process, from the initial stages of
a leader’s career to his major decisions when
in office. The faction is always active and
alert about its program; the masses become
alert during crises when the choice of deci-
sions has already been hopelessly narrowed.
The doctrine of pluralism sees safety in the
competition of many factions, so that labor
unions, business groups, and farm organiza-
tions find some compromise that is within
the public interest. But interest groups push-
ing for the expansion of the military or for
the protection of oil interests in the Middle
East have no counterpart in factions urging
a program of peaceful solution. Though
everyone has a stake in peace, such broad
interests have no organization to counter
the organized factions urging specific objec-
tives which add up to a pattern of war.
III. Types of Conflict Outcomes:
Compromise versus Solution
We have discussed the motivational forces
and the cognitive processes which predis-
pose toward aggressive outcomes of group
conflict. In general, we assume that psycho-
logical processes which reflect the opposite
dimension of these forces will make for
non-violent solutions of group conflict. It is
also necessary to consider the nature of
types of conflict outcomes other than ag-
gressive struggle, in relation to these posi-
tive and negative factors. Four types of con-
flict outcome should be distinguished, only
one of which can properly be termed con-
flict solution or resolution (6). The first type
is the stalemate of aggressive conflict in
which there is no victory for either side but
only a cessation due to exhaustion, with the
prospect of renewed struggle over time. The
second type is conquest and dominance, the
direct result of successful aggressive strug-
gle. This can give the temporary peace in-
dicated by the Russian general who killed
off the insurgents in Warsaw and then wired
the czar, &dquo;Peace reigns in Warsaw.&dquo; But
this outcome was not then, and is not now,
a solution of the conflict between Russia
and Poland. Conflict solution requires an
integration of the needs of both sides to the
dispute so that they find a common path
or a common goal without sacrificing their
basic ethical principles. A common goal rep-
resents a shared objective of the majority
members of both groups. A common path
means that it sometimes is possible to find
a course of action which will satisfy differ-
ing objectives. In some communities in the
United States, white parents may object to
integration of Negroes in the school, not
because they are worried about social status
implications, but because they are afraid of
exposing their children to disease and to
violence. An integrated pattern of schooling
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can bc worked out which will meet these
objections and still meet the needs of the
Negroes for genuine integration. Often
group conflict results from a failure to
analyze carefully the real needs of both
groups in the situation.
Between the domination outcome and the
genuine solution of the group struggle
stands a more ambiguous type of outcome-
that of compromise. &dquo;Compromise&dquo; is used
here in the true meaning of the term, name-
ly, that the ethical principles of the con-
testants are compromised by the final modus
operandi which is agreed upon. This is by
far the most common type of outcome for
both intranational and international conflict.
It does not represent a true solution be-
cause the seeds of aggressive struggle still
remain and the struggle is either continued
at another time or displaced and appears
in other group struggles. Negotiation from
strength and appeasement are the two poles
of the compromise technique. The test of
whether or not the conflict has been com-
promised is to be found in the yielding by
the conflicting parties of some essential
principle of the social ethics of their group
values.
Compromise rather than genuine solution,
it must be admitted, is the common tech-
nique for adjusting group disputes in most
of the civilized societies we know. It is
especially effective within a nation where
there is little possibility for recourse to open
conflict. It is both a product and a cause
of the crisscrossing of the interests of people
in many subgroups within the national
structure. Northern liberals may not become
militant about the integration of Negroes in
the American South because they are mem-
bers of the Democratic party and so feel
that they have to compromise with southern
Democrats. The many points of commonali-
ty of interest between members of groups
make these groups less militant about a
single set of goals. The adjustment of group
differences on the basis of these points of
commonality can be integration or genuine
conflict solution. But frequently it represents
a compromise of the ethical principles of
one or both groups.
Leaders can make a horse trade with
leaders of a rival group both because they
share some common points of interest with
them as against their followers and because
some faction within their own group could
not be mobilized for a stand against the
rival group. This faction may have too much
in common with the particular rival group
to back their leaders on the issues in ques-
tion. Groups lack sufficient unity and homo-
geneity relative to the social context in
which they operate to fight consistently for
their values. The sharp schisms which might
divide a nation into warring camps of social
class against social class, one religion against
another, and one geographical section
against the other, are prevented because
these lines of division cut across one an-
other, as S. Rokkan has pointed out (14). The
price that is paid, however, is to be found
in unresolved problems, in apathy and with-
drawal from realistic social participation
and resulting international strife. The com-
promise technique within the nation often
contributes to the militant action between
nations.
IV. The Role of Consistent Reactive
Participation in Group Decision by
Group Members in Functional and
Political Groups
The genuine solution of group conflict
both within the nation and between nations
is facilitated by any conditions which mini-
mize the role of the six causal factors pre-
viously described, as they operate both
among leaders, factions, and followers. We
shall concern ourselves, however, with only
one major type of condition which has to
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do with the expression of positive forces,
i.e., the counterpart of the factors making
for hostile group action. This condition is
the consistent participation of the many
members in group processes and group de-
cisions in their functional and political
groups. Moreover, this condition of con-
sistent participation refers to a reactive
rather than to a passive role-to a qualita-
tive more than a quantitative criterion.
Membership behavior falls into four general
types.
I. TOKEN AND MINIMAL PARTICIPATION
People may go through the minimal mo-
tions required of them as members of a
group or as citizens. They may sometimes
vote on election day, but they vote for a
familiar name rather than for the merits of
the candidate or for his principles and pro-
gram. This is an expression of the apathy
previously noted. It may be a psychological
withdrawal based upon conflicted indecision
-the inability to take a stand because of
group pressures. Or it may be a truer form
of anomie, in which the individual has been
unable to form any real attachment to
groups or subgroups. Token participation
may also signify lack of involvement for
the group in question but heavy involve-
ment in other groups. Research findings,
however, indicate that this is not the rule,
for there is a good correlation between lev-
els of activity by the same people in various
groups (3).
2. ROUTINE COMPLIANT PARTICIPATION
Routine compliant participation is prob-
ably the most common form of group par-
ticipation. People respond to the cues and
suggestions from formal and informal lead-
ers in routine fashion and show a very lim-
ited conception of their role. This is the
pattern previously described as institutional
conformity based upon our long training in
accepting the rules of the game and the
routine obedience to any form of legitimate
authority. In any given group, however,
routine compliance may represent the low
involvement of the individual whose pri-
mary attachments are to other groups where
he is anything but a compliant member.
3. SPORADIC EMOTIONAL PARTICIPATION
People will show intense emotional ac-
tivity at certain times and for certain forms
of group objectives. There may be a critical
decision, as when a strike vote comes up in
a union. Or the group may be functioning
so poorly that an emergency situation is
created. Or there may be certain types of
group activity involving its emotional sym-
bols which appeal to a certain type of fol-
lower. All these cases may provide oppor-
tunities for emotional expression by group
members. Such expression may be based on
defensive identification with the group or
on the projection of repressed hostility or
on need for excitement in an otherwise drab
existence or on a belated recognition of
problems and a symbolic dealing with them
through intense emotional activity.
4. CONSISTENT REACTIVE PARTICIPATION
Consistent reactive participation refers to
involvement both over time and over a
range of organizational programs. It means,
too, that the individual is involved in the
type of interaction in which he both receives
and sends norms. In a political party or
labor union, it refers to the small core of
active workers who not only take responsi-
bility for the organizational activities but
mold party practice and policy by their sug-
gestions and their active interpretation of
the directions they receive.
A research program, then, might be di-
rected at three major questions concerning
consistent reactive group participation: (1)
What patterns of personality and attitudinal
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and social structure variables maximize con-
sistent reactive participation in functional
and political groups? (2) What are the prior
conditions for the creation and development
of these factors which make for this type
of group participation? (3) Under what
conditions will this type of group participa-
tion lead to a reduction of aggressive group
conflict and war?
We have already suggested some tentative
answers to the first question but will proceed
to make them more explicit. Answers to
the second and third questions will not be
attempted in this paper, but some of the
assumptions basic to the third question will
be considered.




The personality pattern most productive
of consistent reactive participation consists
of ego-strength, self-understanding, empath-
ic understanding, and social extroversion.
People low in this constellation will more
frequently show apathy, compliance, or
sporadic participation. These three com-
ponents are correlated, but the correlation
is moderate rather than high. This pattern
would constitute the democratic personality,
in contrast to the authoritarian personality
described by the California investigators
(11).
A. Ego strength.-This concept describes
the resourceful, secure person whose self-
image tends toward consistency and ac-
curacy with respect to its social effects, who
possesses confidence and tenacity, and who
has developed the executive functions of
the ego (skills for implementing his ob-
jectives ).
B. Sel f -understanding.-The person high
in ego strength is not torn by intense in-
ternal conflict, but he still may not be high
in self-understanding. Self-insight refers to
the understanding of one’s own motivations.
C. Empathic understanding and the abil-
ity to deal with others.-Empathy does not
mean sympathy with the plight of others
but an understanding of their behavior
through an imaginative living-through of
something of the same processes. It is basic
to co-operative working with others, in that
it is the primary mechanism for achieving
a shared understanding of experience.
D. Social extroversion.-The person who
stands high in social extroversion is gregar-
ious and outgoing and finds the process of
doing things with others rewarding. Tan-
nenbaum and Kahn, in their study of the
participation patterns of union members,
found that the active member has greater
social drive but not greater need for social
mobility (15). He has a high level of en-
ergy expenditure, which is socially directed.
2. VALUE SYSTEMS
The personality variables described above
relate to contentless mechanisms of the per-
son. They may predispose toward values of
a given type, but they are not themselves
identical with value systems. Value systems
refer to affective organizations of beliefs
which people hold about classes of objects
or symbols.
A. Internalization of democratic and hu-
manistic values.-Though the followers of
ethical codes which assert the dignity of
the human being have not always imple-
mented these values in democratic practice,
it is nonetheless true that such a philosophy
provides the central reinforcement for our
concept of consistent reactive participation.
Perhaps in the past the emphasis has been
too much on the protection of the person
from infringement of his rights and too little
upon his responsibility to assume an active
role. The internalization we refer to would,
however, include both the negative and the
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positive aspects of democratic functioning.
Internalization of values can occur at two
levels. The child incorporates the values
that his parents hold through an identifica-
tion with them resulting from both the need
of their love and the fear of its loss. In-
ternalization of values at the adult level is
more difficult to achieve, but it can result
from identification with a leader or from
thorough involvement in some process to
which such values are the necessary means.
B. Internalization of specific group goals
of a positive social character.-From the mo-
tivational point of view, the taking-over by
the individual of the goals of the group
gives the dedication which makes for will-
ingness to sacrifice for a cause. From a so-
cial point of view, it makes for clarity of
the position of the group and so enables
others to accept or attempt to modify this
position.
3. BELIEF SYSTEMS
Reference is made here not to evaluations
heavily loaded with affect but to cognitive
functioning.
A. Realistic conception of institutional
functioning as against belief in institutional
fictions.-The realistic point of view would
reject two current forms of the superorganic
notion which have replaced the old belief
in the divine character of the state. One is
the mystical view of group action and of-
ficial decisions as the immutable working of
impersonal forces which are beyond the con-
trol of human beings. The other is the con-
ception that the authorities, officials, and
leaders have full and complete responsibility
for public decisions and policies without the
intervention or involvement of the people
who make up the institution-&dquo;the little-
people complex&dquo; often attributed to the
German people. A people who see the in-
stitutional structure of which they are a part
as existing independently of themselves and
of having a life all its own are, in effect,
surrendering their role in the decision-mak-
ing process and are easily led into any form
of institutional aggressiveness and struggle.
B. Belief in efficacy of individual action.-
This is closely related to a realistic concept
of institutional functioning but is more spe-
cifically oriented to behavior. It can be con-
sidered the action orientation accompanying
the belief system about the nature of in-
stitutions.
4- SOCIAL STRUCTURE VARIABLES
A. Source of power and locus of control
in organizations.-Where power is vested in
the membership of the organization, leaders
have to validate themselves and their poli-
cies by votes of confidence from their fol-
lowers. They can be turned out of office at
the next election, as in political and labor
organizations. In business and administrative
structures, power is often vested in the top
hierarchical group. The group may be the
board of directors, who delegate the control
function to some top executive. This second
type of role structure makes for minimal
participation on the part of the vast majority
of members because there is nothing about
which they have the power to make deci-
sions. Business management often does not
understand why its employees who have
been treated well will prefer a trade union
to the company union. The greater possi-
bility for making decisions about their own
welfare is, of course, a weighty consideration
for the employees. The institutional location
of power and control in an organization thus
sets the limits for membership participation.
In the hierarchical organization there will
tend to be apathy about policies and de-
fensive identification with its symbols.
B. Access to positions of power and priv-
ilege.-Though an organization may be hi-
erarchical on the dimension of power, there
still may be possibilities for upward mo-
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bility. Thus in a government administrative
structure people may attain no decision-
making status until they have reached a cer-
tain level in the hierarchy, but upward
movement in the structure is possible. This
openness of power positions counteracts the
apathy of the hierarchical organization. The
upwardly mobile keep informed and in-
volved on matters of policy. How much mo-
bility is necessary to preserve the belief that
the able and loyal person will be rewarded
by promotion depends upon many other fac-
tors, but often a small amount of real mo-
bility will create a feeling of great openness
of opportunity. On the other hand, where
there is both a power monopoly in the
structure and no upward mobility, the apa-
thy of the members may turn into active
estrangement and hostility (5).
C. Correlation between power, prestige,
privilege, and skill gradients.-The role
structure of organizations minimizes partic-
ipation where there is a hierarchy of power
which is correlated closely with privilege,
prestige, and skill. In other words, if the
people at the top of the hierarchy not only
have the power but, in addition, have the
interesting jobs and perquisites of office,
there is little chance of involving people at
the lower levels in the goals of the organiza-
tion. Hence there is some advantage in some
degree of separation of power, privilege, and
skill gradients. The prestige gradient will
not automatically follow the power gradient
if there is such separation.
D. Institutional use of both common and
differential roles.-If the organization puts
all members into common roles almost ex-
clusively, there is little utilization of dif-
ferential talents of members and hence little
personal reward for the exercise of their
abilities. On the other hand, if there is no
core of common roles, the internalization of
group goals will decrease.
E. Character of multiple group member-
ships.-Individuals can belong to a number
of groups and still participate consistently
if the groups have the same general pur-
poses and values, e.g., trade union, labor
youth, labor party, socialist league. If multi-
ple group memberships include groups of
conflicting and competing objectives, then
we get apathy, whereas similar groups can
have a reinforcing effect upon consistent
participation. Enough of an overlap of the
same key personnel is required to reinforce
and reward participation.
VI. Assumptions about the Relations
of Participation to Group Conflict
Consistent reactive participation has the
following tendencies toward the solution of
group conflict:
1. The power drives of leaders are
checked. Absolute power corrupts absolute-
ly and has dangerous potentialities for ag-
gressive group action. Absolute power and
reactive membership participation are op-
posed forces.
2. Leaders cannot take their people so
readily into violent group struggle through
the pressure of some special faction which
sees profit in struggle or whose defensiveness
is fed by conflict.
3. The instrumentality for constructive
solutions for conflicts between groups can-
not, as a rule, rise above the level of the
instrumental functioning of the groups
themselves. If a group normally operates
through the blind compliance of the ma-
jority, the apathy of many and the emotional
release of a minority, and the power motives
of its leaders, it is not likely that its differ-
ences with other groups will be based upon
the positive social values of the many. Water
does not rise above its level.
4. The very nature of the basic objectives
of the group are dependent upon the con-
sistent reactive participation of the many.
Group goals have taken on a positive social
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and ethical character with the growth of
democracy. The divinity of kings, the ex-
ploitive police state, the authoritarian
church, are not the products of an alert and
widespread participation in group decisions.
5. The involvement of the many in reach-
ing a solution of group differences makes
possible a broader basis for finding common
values and common paths. The people of
two competing nations have more communi-
ty of interest than have the active protago-
nists of conflict on either side.
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